Justice Without Justiciability: A Doctrinal Critique ofthe Right to Justice in International Law

Abstract

International law often speaks of a right to justice, yet victims of violations still struggle to obtain effective, meaningful remedies. This article explains the gap as a problem of legal design, not only of politics or state capacity. It shows that the supposed right is usually derivative, since it depends on proof of a primary breach and on domestic enforcement. It then traces how standing rules, admissibility filters, and fragmented forums favour individual complaints and leave collective harm poorly addressed. The article analyses how attribution tests and standards of due diligence, illustrated by the cases of Velásquez Rodríguez, Osman, and Nicaragua, raise demanding factual thresholds and preserve wide discretion for States. It also examines why treaty bodies and review mechanisms rely on monitoring and persuasion, which weakens follow-up and enforcement. The article concludes that, in international law, the right to justice is best understood not as an autonomous and fully justiciable right, but as a mediated remedial entitlement whose enforcement remains structurally weak.

Dhaka University Law Journal, 2026, 37 (1), 71-98