Analysing farmers’ bargaining power and intermediary control in the potato market of Bangladesh

Abstract

This study examines how farmgate potato prices are formed and how intermediaries influence farmers’ price outcomes in Bangladesh. Using qualitative interviews, thematic analysis, and value chain mapping based on a structured farmer survey across major potato-growing regions, the study finds that price formation is largely governed by an order-driven procurement system—a process where terminal-market Aratdars predefine purchase quantities and prices for their local agents (Beparis), leaving little room for open negotiation at the farm level. Farmgate prices are thus shaped not only by supply and demand but also by institutional and informal mechanisms such as commission charges, cold storage receipt trading, and non-standard weighing practices. These factors enable intermediaries to control market information and timing, resulting in asymmetric price transmission where farmers bear most of the downside risk. Limited market information and dependence on storage further weaken farmers’ bargaining capacity. The study recommends strengthening cooperative-based storage systems and digital price information platforms to improve farmers’ collective bargaining power and ensure fairer value distribution along the potato chain

Bangladesh J. Agril. Res. 50(4): 377-390, December 2025